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1. INTRODUCTION 
The proportion of U.S. agricultural production sold under contract is becoming 
increasingly large. In 2005, 41 percent of the value of U.S. farm production was 
sold under contract, compared to 28 percent in 1991 and just 11 percent in 1965 
(MacDonald and Korb, 2008). Numerous explanations for the increased use of 
contracting have been proposed, including supply-chain organization (Tsoulouhas 
and Vukina, 1999), more discriminating consumers (Barkema, 1993), more 
efficient relationships between buyers and sellers (Drabenstott, 1999), information 
asymmetries (Hennessy, 1996), quality control (Hueth and Ligon, 1999; Hennessy 
and Lawrence, 1999), procurement considerations specific to the dynamics of 
agricultural decision making (Sexton and Zhang, 1996), declining commodity 
prices (Fulton et al., 2003), and the decoupling of farm support legislated in the 
1996 farm bill (Coaldrake et al., 1995). The risk preferences of producers have 
also been shown to impact the intensity of agricultural contracting decisions, with 
more risk-averse farmers preferring production contracts over the use of 
marketing contracts or spot markets in the U.S. hog industry (Zheng et al., 2008). 
Contracted crop production is usually coordinated through marketing 
contracts, which provide for more control and decision rights to the producer 
compared to the production contracts used in livestock production. Marketing 
contracts can serve as a method of price risk management to the producer and/or 
provide a premium to average spot market prices,1 and are used most intensively 
for high-value or trait-specific versions of general commodities (e.g., high-oil 
corn and low-linoleic soybean). Additionally, they can also serve as coordination 
mechanisms in thin markets for specialty crops. 
In general, a contract can be characterized by its allocation of value, risk, 
and decision-making rights among the contractor(s) and contractee(s) (Sykuta and 
Parcell, 2003; Sykuta and Cook, 2001). That contracts are structured, in 
equilibrium, to efficiently allocate risk between the parties towards the goal of 
aligning incentives is an assumption based in the principal-agent approach to 
contract theory (Sheldon, 1996; Allen and Lueck, 1999). There are two very 
general (and related) hypotheses stemming from the standard principal-agent 
approach, namely, (a) higher levels of risk in the contracted activity (i.e., 
agricultural production) should result in contracts more highly motivated by risk-
sharing between the contracting parties,2 and (b) optimal contract design will shift 
a relatively greater share of the risk to the less risk-averse party (Stiglitz, 1974). 
Given these hypotheses, one would expect the preferences and characteristics of 
                                                
1
 MacDonald and Korb (2008) report premiums in the range of 10-20 percent above average U.S. 
spot prices received for corn and soybean from 1996-2005 using the USDA ARMS data. 
2
 See Allen and Lueck (1999) for further discussion and additional references. 
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the contractor and contractee, as well as the characteristics of the commodity 
being contracted, to determine the attributes of the optimal contract. 
The present study contributes to the literature by investigating the 
determinants of agricultural marketing contract design, specifically controlling for 
endogenous matching of principals, agents, and activities. The method advanced 
by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) to control for endogenous matching is applied 
to data from the USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). 
The ARMS data set lends itself well to this purpose, as it is administered to 
thousands of producers every year by the Economic Research Service and the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service and is designed to provide an accurate 
representation of the agricultural sector in the U.S. (ERS, 2008). The survey 
contains a section devoted to marketing and production contracts which includes 
questions regarding the structure of each contract, as well as characteristics of the 
contractor. Furthermore, socioeconomic data are available for each farm included 
in the survey, providing a variety of measures which can be used as proxies for 
farm-level productivity and risk preferences. 
We construct and estimate several models to analyze the association 
between producer and contractor characteristics and the decision to produce under 
contract and the types of contract structures that arise in practice, while 
controlling for the potential for endogenous matching between contracting parties 
and crops. Our results indicate that while producer characteristics are significantly 
associated with the decision to produce corn or soybeans under contract 
(regardless of the specific design of the contract), there is no significant 
association between the same producer characteristics and the specific attributes 
of the contracts, such as its specific pricing terms.  
2. BACKGROUND 
While the theoretical work on contracts has been an important and relatively 
recent development in the economics literature, empirical work in this area has 
produced mixed results. Experimental and survey-based contributions to the 
literature have also been provided, illustrating some support for the relationship 
between the risk attitudes of the producer and the contract attributes in crop and, 
to a larger extent, livestock contracting examples (Lajili et al., 1997; Parcell and 
Langemeier, 1997; Roe et al., 2004). However, inferences based on theoretical 
models, survey responses, or derived from experimental designs may differ from 
the results obtained by analyzing observed contract data. 
2 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 8 [2010], Article 4
Brought to you by | Iowa State University
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/7/16 5:47 PM
There exists a large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
focused on land-tenure contracts.3 Allen and Lueck (1999) performed an 
empirical analysis of the role of risk in contract choice based on a large data set of 
land rental agreements between landlords and farmers in North America. Using an 
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) framework, they found little support for the 
hypothesis that risk-sharing is an important determinant in shaping rental 
agreement contracts and concluded that transaction costs are likely the more 
relevant factor due to the availability of highly developed crop insurance, credit, 
and commodity markets for the management of price and production risks.  
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) built and improved upon previous work on 
land-rental contracts using a data set on crop-sharing agreements in Italy from the 
1400s. They proposed a model which recognized the potential for endogenous 
matching of the contracting parties based on their preferences/characteristics, as 
well as on the characteristics of the commodity being produced. Using estimation 
methods which control for such endogenous matching, they found evidence of 
risk-sharing motivations in their data set which would not have been evident had 
the effects of endogeneity not been controlled. 
Other authors have focused on the impacts of contractor, or principal, 
characteristics on the design of agricultural production and marketing contracts. 
Sykuta and Cook (2001) outlined a theoretical framework that suggests 
differences in the attributes of contracts offered through producer- and investor-
owned firms are motivated by relative levels of trust in the organization on the 
part of producers. Using a survey of crop producers in Missouri, James and 
Sykuta (2006) provided evidence of a producer preference for marketing to 
cooperatives over private or investor-owned firms stemming from a higher level 
of trust in cooperative organizations, with the effect being greater for the 
marketing of soybeans compared to corn. Roe et al. (2004) found a similar 
preference for cooperative firms in the choice of marketing contracts by hog 
producers in their experimental survey approach.  
Analysis specific to marketing contracts and crop production has been 
more limited, with the bulk of the work focusing on the marketing of specialty 
crops such as fruits and vegetables (Fraser, 2005; Hueth and Ligon, 1999; Sexton 
and Zhang, 1996). An exception is the study by Lajili et al. (1997), who employed 
a theoretical model to derive some testable hypotheses regarding the relationships 
between asset specificity, risk aversion, leverage, and the level of cost and risk 
sharing built into crop production and marketing contracts. Using experimental 
data from a survey design, they found that more highly leveraged farms preferred 
                                                
3
 While the relationship between principal and agent under a marketing contract differs from the 
one under a land-tenure contract, the theory can be sufficiently generalized so that predictions 
apply to both types of contracts.  
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contracts over shorter periods of time with higher levels of risk sharing, while 
other observed farmer characteristics, such as age and farm size, did not have a 
significant effect on preferences over a menu of contracts.  
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Following Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), we begin by supposing that there 
exists a general relationship where the attributes of the optimal contract (y) are 
determined by the characteristics of the activity being contracted (c), the principal 
(p), and the agent (a). Such a relationship is represented by a regression as in (1): 
y = αc c + αp p + αa a + ε, (1) 
where the α’s denote coefficients associated with the respective characteristics, 
and ε is an error term. A fundamental problem for estimating (1) arises when the 
agent’s characteristics (a) are unobservable. Unfortunately, this is precisely the 
situation faced by researchers when attempting to fit (1) to investigate the 
hypotheses postulated by contract theory. This is true because according to 
contract theory, the principal and the agent’s risk preferences are crucial 
determinants of the contract attributes, but such preferences are typically 
unobservable. Other unobservable agent characteristics that may be important to 
determine the attributes of the optimal contract are his/her productivity and 
opportunity cost of effort. 
If the relevant agent characteristics are unobservable, (1) cannot be 
estimated as such. However, one may substitute the unobservable characteristics 
with observable variables or proxies (o) correlated with them as in (2), and 
estimate regression (3) instead: 
a = βo o + εa, (2) 
y = αc c + αp p + γo o + εo, (3) 
where γo ≡ αa βo and εo ≡ αa εa + ε. For example, income, wealth, age, off-farm 
income, and the debt-to-asset ratio are often used as proxies for risk aversion 
(Huffman and Just, 2004; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Allen and Lueck, 1999; 
Lajili et al., 1997; Smith and Baquet, 1996), while education and experience are 
commonly used proxies for risk-aversion (Velandia et al., 2009; Sherrick et al.,
2004) and farm-level productivity (Lockheed et al., 1980). Succinctly, the 
problem with estimating (3) by means of standard methods (e.g., OLS) is that the 
coefficients are biased if agents endogenously match with activities and/or 
4 Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization Vol. 8 [2010], Article 4
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principals. If such endogenous matching exists, bias in the coefficients arises 
because of the correlation between the regressors in (3) and the residuals (εo). 
To see why regressors may be correlated with residuals (εo) in (3), 
suppose for example that there is endogenous matching between agents and crops 
because agents with certain characteristics tend to select activities with specific 
features. This association between crops and agents is represented by the 
matching equation (4): 
c = βa a + εc, (4) 
c = βa βo o + βa εa + εc, (4’) 
where (4’) follows from (2). But (4’) implies that the covariance between 
regressor c and εo in (3) equals αa βa Var(εa). Since regressors are correlated with 
the residual in (3), estimation by means of standard methods will yield biased 
coefficient estimates for such a regression (Greene, 2003, p. 75). 
To control for the potential bias induced by endogenous matching, 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) proposed using a two-stage estimation approach 
to account for endogeneity. More specifically, their approach consists of replacing 
the actual values of the potentially endogenous activity and principal variables in 
equation (3) with their respective estimated values. The latter are obtained by 
fitting matching equations like (4’) across non-overlapping geographic regions so 
as to achieve identification. 
The present analysis is performed by means of the approach introduced by 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), employing data from the Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS) which is conducted annually by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. ARMS data include detailed information on 
marketing contracts used by farmers to sell their commodities, and to the best of 
our knowledge it provides the largest data set available for this type of analysis. 
Farmers identify the price, quantity, and value for each commodity sold under 
contracts. The main version of the survey also includes more detailed questions 
about the specifications of the marketing contracts, such as the quantity and 
pricing mechanisms, and characteristics of the contractors. 
Due to availability of information about contract attributes, the analysis is 
based on ARMS data from the main version of the survey for the years 2003, 
2004, and 2005. The sample is further restricted to farmers in the states of Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Ohio who produced corn and/or 
soybeans. The subsample chosen should prevent the results from being driven by 
the substantial differences in technological and environmental resources found 
across the farms in the entire sample. 
5Paulson et al.: Empirical Analysis of Marketing Contract Structures
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Table 1 summarizes the sample statistics for the main variables used in the 
analysis. The dataset used in estimating the decision to contract models are at the 
farm level, and includes 1,647 farm operations. The dataset used to estimate the 
contract attribute models is at the contract level, and includes a total of 1,054 
contracts for corn and soybean production. Since the ARMS data include survey 
weights indicating the number of farms in the U.S. that is represented by each 
farm in the survey sample, means and standard deviations calculated using the 
jackknife approach are also reported in Table 1.4 Such estimates are useful 
because they are representative of all marketing contracts used by U.S. corn and 
soybean producers. For a similar reason, all of the estimations performed and 
reported in the following tables are weighted using the jackknife method. 
Binary dummy variables CornContractD, SoyContractD, FormulaD, 
QualityD, and QuantityD represent the contract characteristics being investigated 
(i.e., variable y in regression (1)). CornContractD (SoyContractD) equals one if 
the farmer enters into a formal contract for corn (soybeans), and equals zero 
otherwise. FormulaD equals one (zero) if the contract does (does not) stipulate a 
commodity price calculated by a formula. QualityD equals one (zero) if the 
contract does (does not) specify that the price be based on quality attributes of the 
commodity. Finally, QuantityD equals one (zero) if the contract does (does not) 
provide for a specific quantity of the commodity. 
Activity characteristics (i.e., variable c in regression (1)) are measured by 
the proportion of the value of the farm’s production obtained from corn and 
soybeans (CornProp and SoyProp, respectively) at the decision to contract level, 
and, at the contract attribute level, by a binary variable equal to one if the contract 
is for corn and equal to zero if the contract is for soybeans (CornD). 
The characteristics of the principal (i.e., variable p in regression (1)) are 
mainly captured by a binary variable describing the organizational structure of the 
contractor, equal to one if the contractor is a cooperative and equal to zero 
otherwise (CoopD). The OtherContD variable acts as a proxy for the market 
power of the contractor(s) available in the area. 
Finally, the variables employed as proxies for the unobservable agent 
characteristics (i.e., variable o in regression (1)) are the value of the farm’s total 
production (VFP), the farm household’s net wealth (HHNW), the total income 
earned off the farm (OFI), the farm operation’s debt-to-asset ratio (DTA), the age 
of the farm operator (Age), the farm operator’s years of experience (Experience) 
and education (Education), and a set of binary variables equal to one if the farm is 
defined as a hobby farm (HobbyD), if the farm purchased crop insurance  
                                                
4
 Dubman (2000) provides details on the jackknife approach and its implementation to analyze 
ARMS data. 
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Farm-Level Data Contract-Level Data 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
CornContractD =1 if the farmer has corn 
contracts 0.184 0.013 n.a. n.a. 
SoyContractD =1 if the farmer has soybean 
contracts 0.171 0.015 n.a. n.a. 
FormulaD = 1 if contract contains a price formula n.a. n.a. 0.130 0.032 
QualityD 
= 1 if the contract specifies 
premiums for commodity 
attributes 
n.a. n.a. 0.214 0.035 
QuantityD = 1 if the contract specifies a quantity to be delivered n.a. n.a. 0.762 0.038 
CornProp Value of corn production to total value of farm production 0.383 0.012 n.a. n.a. 
SoyProp Value of soybean production to total value of farm production 0.362 0.012 n.a. n.a. 
CornD = 1 if the contract is for corn n.a. n.a. 0.560 0.029 
CoopD = 1 if the contractor is a 
cooperative n.a. n.a. 0.489 0.058 
OtherContD = 1 if there are other 
contractors in the area n.a. n.a. 0.631 0.039 
HHNW Household net worth (in $100,000) 9.734 0.453 11.537 0.759 
VFP Value of farm production (in $100,000) 1.854 0.048 2.860 0.240 
OFI Off-farm income (in $100,000) 0.491 0.022 0.549 0.053 
DTA Debt-to-asset ratio 0.140 0.009 0.205 0.017 
Age Operator age (in years) 54.751 0.384 51.646 0.720 
CropInsD = 1 if operator has crop insurance 0.589 0.027 0.786 0.023 
Experience Operator experience (in years) 28.829 0.518 25.959 1.241 
Education Operator education (categorical) 2.389 0.023 2.608 0.133 
7Paulson et al.: Empirical Analysis of Marketing Contract Structures
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics (continued)  
Farm-Level Data Contract-Level Data 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
HobbyD =1 if farm is limited resource or 
rural residence  0.368 0.023 0.194 0.028 
Observations  1,647 1,054 
(CropInsD), or if other contractor alternatives were available in the area 
(OtherContD), and equal to zero otherwise.  
Variables HHNW, OFI, VFP, DTA, Age, and CropInsD are postulated to 
be related to the agent’s behavior toward risk, whereas Experience, Education, 
and HobbyD are posited to be associated with the agent’s productivity. Ceteris 
paribus, farmers with greater levels of net wealth (HHNW), off-farm income 
(OFI), and value of farm production (VFP) are likely to be willing to bear greater 
levels of risk under the common assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion. 
In contrast, following the findings of Lajili et al. (1997), operations with high 
debt-to-asset ratios (DTA) are assumed to induce farmers to take on less risky 
activities relative to similar operations with lower leverage levels.5 Similarly, 
other things equal, older farmers (Age) are likely to be less willing to take on risks 
that may imperil their retirement income due to their life-cycle stage (Fukunaga 
and Huffman, 2009).  
CropInsD is clearly associated with the farmer’s attitudes toward risk, but 
its relationship with risk taking is ambiguous a priori. This is true because 
CropInsD reveals a preference for insurance, and as such a smaller willingness to 
take on risks. However, it may also be argued that a farmer who purchased 
insurance is more willing to take on additional risks. Moreover, choices with 
respect to risk management activities combine to form a risk management 
portfolio with the use of individual tools (i.e. contracting or insurance) impacting 
the use of alternatives (Velandia et al., 2009).  
Productivity is expected to be positively associated with experience 
(Experience) and education (Education), and to be lower for hobby operations 
(HobbyD). Additionally, the hobby farm dummy also controls for differences in 
farm type (i.e., hobby vs. “commercial” farms).  
                                                
5
 Note, however, that higher DTA values may also be associated with less risk-averse producers, as 
farmers with lower levels of risk aversion are more willing to take on more risk through higher 
leverage levels. 
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Conceptually, a farmer’s optimal contract can be considered at two 
different levels, namely, (a) whether to enter a formal contract or not, and (b) 
conditional on contracting, the optimal contract structure. The two levels of 
analysis are discussed in respective order in the next subsections. 
3.1 The Decision to Contract 
A farmer’s decision of whether to enter into a formal contract is examined by 
estimating logit model (5): 
Prob(CropContractD) = 0Cropα  + CropCropPropα  CropProp + CropHHNWγ  HHNW  (5) 
+ CropVFPγ VFP + 
Crop
OFIγ OFI + 
Crop
DTAγ DTA + 
Crop
Ageγ Age  
+ CropCropInsDγ  CropInsD + 
Crop
Experienceγ  Experience + 
Crop
Educationγ  Education  
+ CropHobbyDγ  HobbyD + 
Crop
yD
y Year
δ
∈
∑ YearD + Cropε , 
for Crop = {Corn, Soy} and Year = {2004, 2005}. Except for the omission of the 
principal characteristics, regression (5) has the same structure as (3). Principal 
characteristics cannot be included in (5) because ARMS contains information 
about the contractor only for those farms who choose to contract. 
The CropProp variable describes the relative intensity of the farm’s 
production of the commodity which is potentially being contracted, which is 
assumed to be an endogenous choice of the farm operator. This endogeneity is 
controlled for through the OLS estimation of a matching equation like (4’) for 
each state, outlined in equation (6): 
CropProps = 0,
CropProp
sη  + ,
CropProp
HHNW sη HHNWs + ,
CropProp
VFP sη VFPs  (6) 
+ 
,
CropProp
OFI sη OFIs + ,
CropProp
DTA sη DTAs + ,
CropProp
Age sη  Ages  
+ 
,
CropProp
CropInsD sη CropInsDs + ,
CropProp
Experience sη Experiences  
+ 
,
CropProp
Education sη Educations + ,
CropProp
HobbyD sη HobbyDs  
+ 
,
CropProp
yD s
y Year
δ
∈
∑ YearDs + CropPropsε , 
for Crop = {Corn, Soy} and s = { Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Ohio}. Evidence for endogeneity exists if the coefficient estimates from (6) are 
statistically different across states. Thus, we also estimated (6) across the pooled 
sample including state dummies interacted with each of the regressors. Individual 
t-tests performed on the interaction term coefficients indicated that effects differ 
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across states, providing evidence for endogeneity and justification for our two-
stage approach.6 Contract equation (5) is then estimated using the predicted values 
of CropProp from the estimated matching equations. 
State dummies are not included in the estimation of (5) to satisfy exclusion 
restrictions. To justify this exclusion, the advocated model assumes that 
relationship (1) holds regardless of the state. This assumption is similar to, e.g., 
assuming the same production function for a cross section of farmers when 
estimating production parameters. It is not possible to prove or disprove this 
assumption, because to do so would require fitting relationship (1) on a state-by-
state basis. The required data on principal characteristics (p) are not available. To 
make this assumption more tenable, we restrict our attention to corn and soybean 
contracts for relatively homogeneous states within the Corn Belt region. 
To account for the additionally variability introduced by the use of 
estimates from the first-stage in obtaining the estimation results for the second-
stage, we have implemented a two-stage jackknife procedure to adjust the second-
stage standard errors. For each jackknife subsample, first-stage estimates were 
computed and fitted values were generated for the entire sample. Then, second-
stage estimates were computed for each of the first-stage subsamples. Reported 
standard errors are based on the resulting sampling distribution of the second-
stage estimates. 
3.2 The Contract Attributes 
To examine the impacts of the commodity type, the contractor, and the 
characteristics of the operator on the contract attributes, regression (3) is 
specialized to the logit model (7): 
Prob(AttributeD) = 0AttributeDα  + AttributeDCornDα  CornD + AttributeDCoopDα  CoopD  (7) 
+ AttributeDOtherContDα  OtherContD+ 
AttributeD
HHNWγ  HHNW  
+ AttributeDVFPγ  VFP + 
AttributeD
OFIγ  OFI + 
AttributeD
DTAγ  DTA  
+ AttributeDAgeγ  Age + 
AttributeD
CropInsDγ  CropInsD + 
AttributeD
Experienceγ  Experience  
+ AttributeDEducationγ  Education + 
AttributeD
HobbyDγ  HobbyD  
+ AttributeDyD
y Year
δ
∈
∑ YearD + AttributeDε , 
                                                
6
 The estimation results from the state-level and pooled matching equations are not the main 
results of interest for our analysis and, therefore, not provided. They are available from the authors 
upon request.  
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for Attribute = {Formula, Quality, Quantity} and Year = {2004, 2005}. The 
specific contract attributes analyzed are whether the price received by the farmer 
is determined by a formula (FormulaD) or based on quality attributes of the 
commodity delivered to the contractor (QualityD), and whether the contract is for 
a specified quantity of product (QuantityD). 
Endogeneity of the contractor and crop type variables is controlled for 
through the logit model matching equations (8) and (9):7 
Prob(CropDs) = 0,CornDsη  + ,CornDOtherContD sη  OtherContDs + ,CornDHHNW sη  HHNWs  (8) 
+ 
,
CornD
VFP sη  VFPs + ,
CornD
OFI sη  OFIs + ,
CornD
DTA sη  DTAs + ,
CornD
Age sη  Ages  
+ 
,
CornD
CropInsD sη  CropInsDs + ,
CornD
Experience sη  Experiences  
+ 
,
CornD
Education sη  Educations + ,
CornD
HobbyD sη  HobbyDs  
+ 
,
CornD
yD s
y Year
δ
∈
∑ YearDs + CornDsε , 
Prob(CoopDs) = 0,CoopDsη  + ,CoopDOtherContD sη  OtherContDs  (9) 
+ 
,
CoopD
HHNW sη  HHNWs + ,
CoopD
VFP sη  VFPs + ,
CoopD
OFI sη  OFIs  
+ 
,
CoopD
DTA sη  DTAs + ,
CoopD
Age sη  Ages + ,
CoopD
CropInsD sη  CropInsDs  
+ 
,
CoopD
Experience sη  Experiences + ,
CoopD
Education sη  Educations  
+ 
,
CoopD
HobbyD sη  HobbyDs + ,
CoopD
yD s
y Year
δ
∈
∑ YearDs + CoopDsε , 
for Crop = {Corn, Soy} and s = { Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Ohio}. For identification purposes, matching equations (8) and (9) are estimated 
by state, and a logit regression is then used to estimate (7) excluding state 
dummies and using the predicted values for CropD and CoopD. As before, the 
matching equations were also estimated across the pooled sample with state 
dummies interacted with the regressors to test for endogeneity. Similar to the 
decision-to-contract analysis, the individual t-tests on the interaction coefficient 
estimates provided evidence of endogeneity, again justifying our two-stage 
approach. 
                                                
7
 The potential for endogeneity in the availability of other contractors (OtherContD) may also 
exist, especially from the contractor’s perspective and over a long-term decision horizon. We 
assume the availability of or access to other contractors is exogenous to the producer, at least for 
the short-term horizon over which the analysis is conducted. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Results corresponding to the estimation of regressions (5) and (7) are discussed in 
respective order in the following two subsections. 
4.1 The Decision to Contract 
Table 2 reports the regression results, marginal effects, McFadden’s R2, and 
Count R2 (percent of correctly predicted values) for the farmer’s decision to 
produce corn under contract. The naïve8 results of the logit model estimation 
imply that more intensive corn operations (i.e., those with larger CornProp
values) are more likely to enter into contracts for corn. However, after adjusting 
for endogeneity, the effect of the farm’s corn intensity is found to be statistically 
insignificant. The effect of adjusting for endogeneity was also found to impact the 
statistical significance of the value of production (VFP) and debt-to-asset ratio 
(DTA) variables. Thus, not correcting for endogeneity could lead to misleading 
conclusions related to the effects of these agent characteristics on contracting 
decisions.  
Among the set of risk-related explanatory variables in the logit model for 
corn, only the crop insurance (CropInsD) dummy was found to be statistically 
significant. Farmers who purchase some form of crop insurance were found to be 
more likely to enter into marketing contracts for corn. The presence of crop 
insurance increased the probability of contracting corn by an estimated 13.17 
percent based on the marginal effects implied by the adjusted coefficients.  
This result is consistent with previous research which has indicated the 
potential for more intensive use of marketing options in the presence of crop 
insurance (Paulson et al., 2008; Coble et al., 2000). The explanation behind these 
results is fairly intuitive. Yield insurance covers the yield risk that could 
exacerbate losses under a marketing contract, ultimately reducing the risk of the 
farmer not being able to deliver on a contract. Revenue insurance covers both 
yield and price risk, thus reducing the incentive to enter into a marketing contract 
to manage price risk. 
                                                
8
 Following Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), naïve regressions refer to those estimated without 
instrumenting to correct for potential endogenous matching. We report these to allow for 
comparison with the two-stage results which adjust for endogeneity. 
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Table 2. Logit Estimation Results for the Decision to Contract Corn 
Naïve Adjusted 
Variable 
Coef. Est. 
(St. Error) 
Est. Marginal 
Effect 
Coef. Est. 
(St. Error) 
Est. Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept -2.712*** (0.730) n.a. 
-2.328*** 
(0.585) n.a. 
CornProp
 
1.843*** 
(0.484) 0.3210 
1.073 
(0.876) 0.1942 
HHNW 0.017 (0.014) 0.0029 
0.018 
(0.014) 0.0032 
VFP 0.054* (0.029) 0.0095 
0.044 
(0.030) 0.0079 
OFI 0.349 (0.326) 0.0607 
0.316 
(0.296) 0.0573 
DTA 1.354** (0.627) 0.2358 
1.362** 
(0.668) 0.2466 
Age -0.015 (0.015) -0.0027 
-0.012 
(0.018) -0.0022 
CropInsD 0.715*** (0.216) 0.1246 
0.727*** 
(0.226) 0.1317 
Experience -0.001 (0.011) -0.0003 
-0.007 
(0.015) -0.0012 
Education -0.045 (0.216) -0.0079 
-0.044 
(0.223) -0.0079 
HobbyD -0.721** (0.318) -0.1255 
-0.650* 
(0.341) -0.1177 
2004D 0.788*** (0.243) 0.1372 
0.737*** 
(0.208) 0.1335 
2005D 0.781** (0.378) 0.1360 
0.714* 
(0.391) 0.1292 
McFadden R2 
Count R2 
0.121 
0.707 
0.099 
0.663 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
In the case of productivity-related explanatory variables for the decision to 
contract corn production, the hobby farm dummy (HobbyD) was found to 
negatively impact the decision to contract and was statistically significant at a 10 
percent level. The estimated coefficient implied that hobby farms were, on 
average, 11.77 percent less likely to use contracts for corn production. Hobby 
operators may be less inclined to contract their corn production, as they may 
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assign a relatively larger weight on the negative aspects of contracts (e.g., the 
potential liability burden and the loss of managerial freedom associated with 
contracting). None of the other farm characteristics, such as the net wealth of the 
household (HHNW), off-farm income (OFI), and the operator’s age (Age), 
experience (Experience), and education (Education) were estimated to have 
significant effects on the probability of producing corn under contract. 
Table 3. Logit Estimation Results for the Decision to Contract Soybeans 
Naïve Adjusted 
Variable 
Coef. Est. 
(St. Error) 
Est. Marginal 
Effect 
Coef. Est. 
(St. Error) 
Est. Marginal 
Effect 
Intercept -1.571*** (0.552) n.a. 
-3.146*** 
(1.010) n.a. 
SoyProp
 
0.936* 
(0.524) 0.1580 
4.661** 
(1.817) 0.7763 
HHNW 0.005 (0.009) 0.0008 
0.006 
(0.012) 0.0010 
VFP 0.054** (0.027) 0.0091 
0.093*** 
(0.035) 0.0156 
OFI 0.092 (0.100) 0.0155 
0.082 
(0.094) 0.0137 
DTA 1.207** (0.612) 0.2038 
2.014*** 
(0.781) 0.3355 
Age -0.022* (0.016) -0.0037 
-0.021 
(0.016) -0.0035 
CropInsD 0.353* (0.202) 0.0596 
0.499* 
(0.264) 0.0832 
Experience -0.003 (0.013) 0.0006 
0.004 
(0.016) 0.0007 
Education -0.050 (0.154) -0.0084 
-0.120 
(0.168) -0.0200 
HobbyD -0.571** (0.290) -0.0964 
-0.914*** 
(0.350) -0.1522 
2004D 0.414 (0.274) 0.0699 
0.355 
(0.283) 0.0592 
2005D 0.917*** (0.317) 0.1549 
0.794** 
(0.391) 0.1323 
McFadden R2 
Count R2 
0.071 
0.667 
0.091 
0.681 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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The results for soybean contracts are reported in Table 3.9 The intensity of 
soybean production is estimated to be significantly and positively associated with 
the decision to contract soybean after adjusting for endogeneity, with an increase 
of 10 percent (0.10) in the proportion of soybean production on an operation 
increasing the probability of using contracts by an estimated 7.76 percent on 
average.  
Larger farms, as measured by the value of production (VFP), are estimated 
to be more likely to contract, with an increase of $100,000 in the VFP leading to a 
1.56 percent greater probability of using contracts. Operations with greater debt-
to-asset ratios are also significantly more likely to grow soybean under contract, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that more highly leveraged farms are more 
likely to engage in risk management activities. The effects of the CropInsD and 
HobbyD variables are similar to those for corn contracts. Farms with crop 
insurance are significantly more likely to produce soybean under contract, as the 
presence of crop insurance is estimated to increase the probability of soybean 
contract use by 8.32 percent. Hobby farms are significantly less likely to enter 
into contracts for soybean, with an estimated average marginal effect of -15.22 
percent on the probability of contracting soybean for those operations defined as 
hobby farms. The relationships between farm size, type, and the propensity for 
contracting are consistent with the observations of MacDonald and Korb (2008) 
in analyzing the ARMS data. 
As with the results for corn contracts, other farm characteristics such as 
HHNW, OFI, Experience, and Education were not found to be insignificant 
explanatory variables in the decision to use marketing contracts for soybean 
production. The lack of significance of these farm characteristics was robust to a 
number of alternative specifications for both the corn and soybean contract 
models. 
Note that the crop intensity variable (CornProp) was found to be positive 
and significant for corn contract decisions prior to the adjustment for endogeneity. 
However, once the matching equation (6) is included and the estimates in the 
contracting decision equation (5) are adjusted, the crop intensity variable was 
found to be non-significant. The opposite effect was found for the decision to 
contract soybean, with the crop intensity variable (SoyProp). Adjusting for 
endogeneity results in a coefficient estimate for the SoyProp variable implying an 
effect four times as large as the naïve estimate. Moreover, the naïve estimate was 
only significant at the 10 percent level, whereas the adjusted estimate was 
significant at 5 percent. Among the limited subset of other variables that were 
                                                
9
 Among the 1,647 farms in the sample, 383 (23 percent) farms entered into contracts for corn or 
soybeans while 202 (12 percent) farms entered into contracts for both corn and soybeans. A total 
of 1,264 (77 percent) of the farms in the sample did not enter into contracts for either crop. 
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estimated to have a statistically significant effect on contracting decisions, the 
magnitudes of the coefficient estimates and corresponding marginal effects also 
differed. At the very least, this implies that endogenous matching may be a 
concern and the failure to adjust for this effect could lead to biased results and 
inaccurate inferences related to the relationship between the farm or agent 
characteristics on the decision to produce corn or soybean under contract. 
4.2 The Contract Attributes 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures10 for the 
specific contract attribute models defined by equation (7). The second and third 
columns show the estimates corresponding to the naïve and adjusted logit models 
where the dependent variable is whether the price received under the contract is 
determined by a formula (FormulaD). The use of a formula implies a larger 
degree of price uncertainty relative to a contract which specifies a single 
deterministic price. Therefore, one would expect more risk-averse producers to 
prefer contracts that outline a single price. Similarly, producers would be 
expected to be more willing to accept contracts with formula prices (i.e., more 
price risk) with a cooperative organization that garners greater levels of trust 
(James and Sykuta, 2006). However, neither producer risk nor productivity 
characteristics nor the organizational structure of the contractor were found to 
significantly impact whether the contract included a formula-based pricing 
mechanism.  
The insignificance of the explanatory variables held even after the 
estimation procedure was adjusted to account for potential endogeneity. The 
fourth and fifth columns of Table 4 report, respectively, the naïve and adjusted 
estimates of the effects of producer and contractor characteristics on the 
likelihood of prices received under the contract being conditional on quality 
attributes of the contracted product (QualityD). Similar to contracts with formula 
pricing, tying price to quality attributes of the commodity may expose the farmer 
to more price risk driven by quality uncertainty. This implies that, all else equal, 
more risk-averse producers would tend to enter into contracts where price is 
independent of quality attributes. However, as in the case of formula pricing, the 
ARMS data provide no statistically significant evidence of the utilization of 
contracts with quality-contingent prices differing across producers or contractor 
types. Again, the insignificance of the crop, contractor, and farm characteristics 
applied to the results from both the naïve and adjusted estimation procedures. 
                                                
10
 Marginal effects for the contract attribute models are not reported due to the overall 
insignificance of the parameter estimates and to conserve space. They are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Finally, the sixth and seventh columns of Table 4 report the naïve and 
adjusted estimates for the regressions where the dependent variable is whether or 
not the contract outlines a specific quantity to be delivered by the producer 
(QuantityD). Specifying a quantity exposes the producer to a greater share of the 
commodity production risk, so one would expect more risk-averse producers to be 
more likely to enter into contractual arrangements that do not specify a quantity to 
be delivered to the contractor. The QuantityD results differ slightly from those of 
the other attribute models shown in Table 4 in that more highly educated 
producers are more likely to use contracts where quantities are specified. Farmers 
with higher educational levels11 were estimated to increase the likelihood of 
contracting by 12.8 percent. As for the other characteristics included in the 
analysis, no evidence of any significant effects was found indicating whether 
marketing contracts outlining specific quantities to be delivered are more or less 
likely to be used. 
The regression results are surprising in that contract theory predicts that 
the risk preferences and characteristics of the contracting parties should impact 
the resulting contract. A number of arguments could be used to explain our 
findings. First, other than organizational structure (CoopD), we lacked data on the 
principals. It is possible for contractors to be relatively more risk averse than 
producers, in which case the (unobserved) risk preferences of the former may be 
the main drivers of the contract outcomes. A related explanation is the potential 
market power of the contractors. If only one or a limited number of contractors 
are located within feasible proximity, producers may lack the ability to negotiate 
specific contract terms. In this instance, the characteristics and preferences of the 
contractor would tend to determine the specific contract designs, with the 
producers effectively being faced with take-it or leave-it offers. Additionally, as 
was previously stated, our ability to separate the allocation of value at the contract 
level was limited by the nature of the data. The contract specifications associated 
with higher levels of relative risk (e.g., formula prices or specific quantities) may 
use higher price premiums to compensate for the additional price or production 
risk. 
Finally, the observation of insignificance may be due to the choice of 
crops and regions examined. As highlighted by Allen and Lueck (1999), there 
exists highly developed commodity, credit, and, for corn and soybean, subsidized 
insurance markets that can be used to manage and mitigate price and production 
risks. The importance and ability of risk-sharing to be achieved through contract 
design may be dominated by the opportunities afforded by these other risk 
management alternatives.  
                                                
11
 The ARMS data includes four education levels: 1) less than high school, 2) high school, 3) some 
college, and 4) college graduate and beyond. 
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Table 4. Logit Estimation Results for Specific Attributes Conditional on Contracting 
FormulaD QualityD QuantityD 
Variable Naïve Adjusted Naïve Adjusted Naïve Adjusted 
Intercept -2.789 (2.330) 
-2.879 
(2.955) 
-4.863 
(3.206) 
-4.493 
(3.411) 
0.355 
(1.248) 
1.143 
(1.444) 
CornD 0.337 (0.380) 
0.119 
(1.660) 
-0.048 
(0.244) 
-1.479 
(1.478) 
0.240 
(0.262) 
-1.280 
(1.738) 
CoopD -0.333 (0.746) 
0.056 
(1.479) 
0.654 
(0.559) 
0.777 
(1.379) 
-0.599** 
(0.285) 
-1.064 
(0.855) 
OtherContD -0.736 (-0.750) 
-0.750 
(0.792) 
0.074 
(0.387) 
0.143 
(0.380) 
0.560 
(0.766) 
0.619 
(0.785) 
HHNW 0.014 (0.016) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
VFP -0.003 (0.053) 
-0.001 
(0.053) 
-0.096 
(0.066) 
-0.101 
(0.067) 
-0.053 
(0.043) 
-0.058 
(0.048) 
OFI -0.310 (0.767) 
-0.293 
(0.827) 
0.333 
(0.509) 
0.380 
(0.536) 
-0.321 
(0.320) 
-0.264 
(0.363) 
DTA -1.287 (1.559) 
-1.286 
(1.575) 
-1.151 
(1.563) 
-1.014 
(1.561) 
0.564 
(0.886) 
0.771 
(0.897) 
Age -0.018 (0.053) 
-0.018 
(0.053) 
-0.040 
(0.055) 
-0.033 
(0.055) 
-0.042 
(0.032) 
-0.039 
(0.033) 
CropInsD 0.597 (1.021) 
0.568 
(1.084) 
0.419 
(0.961) 
0.454 
(1.032) 
0.405 
(0.761) 
0.584 
(0.755) 
Experience 0.042 (0.054) 
0.043 
(0.053) 
0.061 
(0.052) 
0.050 
(0.055) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.027) 
Education 0.113 (0.540) 
0.121 
(0.495) 
0.472 
(0.457) 
0.513 
(0.491) 
0.844** 
(0.369) 
0.881** 
(0.403) 
HobbyD 0.138 (1.002) 
0.109 
(1.048) 
0.419 
(1.042) 
0.266 
(1.102) 
-0.290 
(0.482) 
-0.385 
(0.495) 
2004D 0.615 (0.577) 
0.574 
(0.587) 
0.218 
(1.113) 
0.421 
(1.092) 
-0.046 
(0.585) 
0.208 
(0.602) 
2005D 0.496 (0.720) 
0.475 
(0.747) 
3.525*** 
(0.973) 
3.546*** 
(0.917) 
0.632 
(0.553) 
0.698 
(0.536) 
McFadden R2 
Count R2 
0.091 
0.585 
0.084 
0.583 
0.345 
0.803 
0.347 
0.801 
0.120 
0.537 
0.129 
0.552 
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While contract theory postulates that there exists a link between certain 
characteristics of the principal and agent and the resulting contract between the 
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parties, there seems to be limited support for this relationship in the scant 
empirical literature devoted to marketing contracts used for crop production. We 
add to the empirical literature on marketing contracts by applying the econometric 
method proposed by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) to ARMS survey data for 
corn and soybean producers in six Midwestern states from 2003 through 2005. 
The method accounts for the potential impact on estimation and inference of 
endogenous matching between agents, contractors, and activities. The estimation 
of the contracting equation is performed using instrumental variables to correct 
for the potential impact of endogenous matching. Our results at the contract 
decision level illustrate that the failure to account for this potential endogeneity 
can impact the magnitude of the coefficient estimates as well as the interpretation 
of those estimates with respect to their statistical significance.  
We find evidence of producer characteristics impacting the decision to 
grow corn or soybean under formal contract agreements. These effects are largely 
consistent with both theoretical predictions and those based on survey data and 
experimental approaches reported in previous studies. For example, farmers who 
purchase crop insurance are more likely to produce corn and soybean under 
contract while small hobby farms are less likely to use marketing contracts. Farm 
size and leverage are found to have positive and significant impacts on the use of 
contracts for soybean production. However, we find almost no evidence of 
observed producer or contractor characteristics impacting the attributes of the 
marketing arrangements at the contract level, more specifically pricing, quality, 
and quantity provisions within the contract. 
Our findings indicate that factors other than the proxies used for farmer 
risk preferences may play a more dominant role in determining the specific 
structure of agricultural marketing contracts for corn and soybean in the Midwest, 
which is a result consistent with previous work in other areas. For example, the 
risk preferences of the contractor (principal), which are also largely unobserved 
and for which proxies do not exist in the ARMS data, have been shown to impact 
the attributes of land-tenure contracts observed in practice (Fukunaga and 
Huffman, 2009; Huffman and Just, 2004; Rainey et al., 2005). Monopoly power 
of the contractor might also limit the menu of contract options available to 
producers as well as their negotiating power with respect to contract terms.12 
These results should be interpreted with care due to the limitations of the 
data under study. In particular, the lack of information about the value derived 
from the specific contracts that are comparable across observations makes it 
                                                
12
 This should be differentiated between the pricing of contracts under monopoly. For example, 
Katchova (2010) analyzed the effect of having multiple vs. single contractors available in a single 
area, and found that the prices offered by monopolist contractors did not statistically differ from 
those offered in a more competitive environment. 
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difficult to separate the effects of compensation (allocation of value) from those 
of producer and contractor characteristics. Also, the majority of principal and 
agent characteristics that are postulated to affect contract choice and design (e.g., 
risk preferences) are unobserved and therefore observed proxy measures are used 
in their place. Consequently, the explanatory power of our models is limited by 
how well the observed variables proxy the true unobserved characteristics.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned qualifications, our results lead to 
potentially important implications for both contract theory and contract design as 
they are applied to production agriculture. If in fact observed producer and 
contractor characteristics are not determining factors in the design of marketing 
contracts, further theoretical and empirical research is warranted to uncover and 
identify their underlying motivations. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, 
ARMS represents the largest data set available allowing for this type of analysis. 
Despite the existing data limitations, it would be exceedingly difficult to collect 
primary data that would be as rich and include a more representative collection of 
agricultural producers in the U.S. 
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